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JUSTICE Oliver Wendell Holmes pioneered the clear and presentdanger test as the constitutional yardstick for determining when thegovernment could punish speech that might cause social harms.1 The
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1. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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Supreme Court’s decision in Schenck v. United States, with Justice
Holmes writing for a unanimous bench, was issued on March 3, 1919.
Schenck held that the government may criminalize speech if it has a bad
tendency—meaning that it makes unlawful conduct more likely to take
place.2
By the fall of 1919, however, Justice Holmes had experienced a serious
change of heart. Although nominally continuing to advocate for the use
of the clear and present danger test to determine when the government
may criminalize mere speech, Holmes’s articulation of the test underwent
a radical transformation between March 3 and November 10. During this
period, the clear and present danger test, at least as Justice Holmes ar-
ticulated and applied it, underwent a near-total transformation from a
very weak test that permitted the government to proscribe speech that
could have a bad tendency to a highly demanding test that required the
government to tolerate even speech “fraught with death” in order to
meet the requirements of the First Amendment.3
Unfortunately for Justice Holmes, his colleagues on the Supreme Court
strongly preferred his original articulation and application of the clear
and present danger test.4 Accordingly, the test continued to work major
mischief from 1919 to 1969, when the Supreme Court, in Brandenburg v.
Ohio, glossed the test in such a way as to require both a direct call to
serious unlawful action and a high probability that the call to arms would
be heeded.5 Cases subsequent to Brandenburg have usually, but not al-
ways, applied this test in a demanding fashion.6
Nevertheless, the ghost of the clear and present danger test still stalks
the pages of the United States Reports. This is because judges, like almost
2. Id. (holding that speech may be criminalized if “its tendency and the intent with
which it is done” reflect a subjective desire to bring about an unlawful result because the
First Amendment does not require “success alone [as a condition of] making the act [of
speaking] a crime”).
3. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508–09 (1951). As Chief Justice
Fred M. Vinson stated the proposition, “[T]he words [of the First Amendment] cannot
mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be
executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited.” Id. at 509. Thus, “an attempt
to overthrow the Government by force, even though doomed from the outset because of
inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to pre-
vent.” Id. Even feeble or ineffectual attempts to overthrow the government may be crimi-
nally prohibited because “[t]he damage which such attempts create both physically and
politically to a nation makes it impossible to measure the validity in terms of the
probability of success, or the immediacy of a successful attempt.” Id.
5. See 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that the First Amendment
does “not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action” and explaining that mere abstract
advocacy of unlawful action at some indefinite time in the future may not be criminalized).
6. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107–09 (1973) (per curiam) (invalidating a
breach of the peace conviction based on an anti-war protester telling a law enforcement
officer, “We’ll take the fucking street later” or “We’ll take the fucking street again” be-
cause, in context, “there was no evidence or rational inference from the import of the
language, that his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent
disorder”).
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everyone else, are prone to mass panic and fear of mass-casualty terroris-
tic attacks.7 It is easy enough to say that judges have a particular and
special duty to exhibit courage in times of mass panic and distress—after
all, as Professor Vince Blasi has famously argued, it is precisely in these
times that the First Amendment is most needed to aid those with the
temerity to raise dissenting voices.8 One can easily agree with Professor
Blasi’s separate but related point that a commitment to civil liberty in
general—and the freedom of speech in particular—requires “civic cour-
age” of all government officials (but especially judges).9
The difficulty of getting judges to act consistently with these normative
commitments remains.10 Indeed, when judges exhibit extraordinary cour-
7. For a relevant discussion of the psychology literature and some useful suggestions
on how judges might try to take account of the dangers of mass panic, see Christina E.
Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 115,
158–222. Professor Wells notes that judges “remain subject to the same passions, fears, and
prejudices that sweep the rest of the nation.” Id. at 117. Accordingly, “[i]t is one thing . . .
for us to say that courts should take a more active role in protecting civil liberties” but
“quite another to say that they the will.” Id.
8. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449, 449–50 (1985). In my view, there is really no serious disputing Professor
Blasi’s normative argument that protecting dissent is most vital when the very survival of
the institutions of government seem to be at some risk. See id. at 449–50, 472–75. However,
the problem is not getting federal judges to agree with this proposition in the abstract; the
difficulty lies in getting them to observe the principle when the potential social cost of
protecting speech seems astonishingly high. In times of crisis, most judges, most of the
time, revert to the “Hand Formula,” meaning they take into account the severity of the
evil, discounted by its probability, to determine whether particular speech should enjoy
First Amendment protection. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)
(“In each case [federal judges] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. We
have purposely substituted ‘improbability’ for ‘remoteness,’ because that must be the right
interpretation.”), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
510 (1951) (citing and quoting the Hand Formula and observing that “it is as succinct and
inclusive as any other [test] we might devise at this time” and “takes into consideration
those factors which we deem relevant”).
9. See Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Idea of Civic Courage: The Bran-
deis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 690–91 (1988) (ob-
serving that “[t]o Brandeis, the measure of courage in the civic realm is the capacity to
experience or even anticipate change—even rapid and fundamental change—without los-
ing perspective or confidence” and positing that “the freedom of speech may be most valu-
able for its indirect effect, salutary even if subtle, on public attitudes toward change”). But
cf. GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST AMEND-
MENT 230, 252–53 (2017) (noting that “[n]o wealthy or powerful speaker has ever lost a
major First Amendment case in the Roberts Court” and criticizing the system of “managed
speech” that the Roberts Court has developed because it “plac[es] a high premium on
social and political stability,” “encourages a public discussion where a limited number of
speakers exchange a limited range of ideas,” and relies on “powerful government and pri-
vate managers to keep public discussion within responsible boundaries”). The kind of
“managed speech” regime to which Professor Magarian objects so vociferously is literally
the antithesis of a scheme of First Amendment rights premised on civic courage. See Blasi,
supra, at 676–77, 682–84 (describing and discussing the concept of civic courage that ani-
mates the Brandeis concurring opinion in Whitney and arguing that “the ideal of civic cour-
age expressed in the Whitney opinion constitutes one of the generative ideas of the [F]irst
[A]mendment tradition”).
10. See Wells, supra note 7, at 117–18 (“While in the legal paradigm, adherence to the
law and its objective criteria is supposed to prevent fear and prejudice from infecting judi-
cial resolution of issues, even the Supreme Court’s doctrine most protective of civil liber-
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age under difficult circumstances, as was the case with some very brave
lower federal court judges in the Deep South tasked with implementing
the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,11 legal
scholars and historians describe them as “unlikely heroes” precisely be-
cause this kind of courage under fire comes as something of a surprise.12
More often than not, judicial courage proves to be in short supply—
particularly in times of war or civil unrest. The Supreme Court itself has
issued some truly horrendous decisions in periods of war, more likely
than not because the Justices harbored misgivings about strict enforce-
ment of constitutional rights at times and in places where doing so could
impose very high social costs.13 It bears noting that clear-and-present-
danger-type reasoning is hardly limited to the First Amendment; Justice
Hugo L. Black deployed it to disastrous effect in Korematsu v. United
States, holding that “when under conditions of modern warfare our shores
are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensu-
rate with the threatened danger.”14
In other words, the ends justify the means. That, in essence, is what
“clear and present danger” reasoning reduces to when taken to its logical
conclusion. The government may act as it has acted because the justifica-
tion for abridging or trampling fundamental rights is sufficiently compel-
ling and, given the stakes, the imprecision of the exact means used by the
government to achieve those ends is of no moment. The whole point of
creating entrenched rights protected by a power of judicial review, how-
ever, is to prevent the government from taking actions that violate our
civic community’s first principles.
ties has proven no match for the infecting atmosphere associated with national security
crises.”).
11. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
12. See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 14 (1981). Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr., who
served on the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama during the height of
the civil rights movement in the American South, provided a particularly salient example
of a jurist possessed with a deep well of “civic courage”—in addition to an unrelenting
commitment to enforcing fully and fairly the constitutional rights of litigants who appeared
in his courtroom. See JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE
FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR. AND THE SOUTH’S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 3 (1993). Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King Jr. once remarked of Judge Johnson that he “gave true meaning to the
word ‘justice.’” Id. Operationalizing a “pathological perspective” to enforce the First
Amendment strictly in times of social unrest and civic stress would require a great many
Frank Johnsons. (In the interests of full disclosure, I should note that I had the privilege of
serving as a law clerk to Judge Johnson from July 1991 to September 1992.)
13. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944) (upholding the
involuntary imprisonment in military concentration camps of Japanese-American citizens
who resided on the West Coast during World War II despite the fact that “[c]ompulsory
exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direct
emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions”), abrogated
by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
597–600 (1940) (upholding a mandatory flag salute statute because “[t]he wisdom of train-
ing children in patriotic impulses by those compulsions which necessarily pervade so much
of the educational process is not for our independent judgment”), overruled by W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
14. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220.
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In times of peace and prosperity, it is easy for federal judges to hold the
line. In times of stress and tumult, however, holding the line can seem
difficult because judges, like anyone else, have to ask themselves: “But
what if the government’s assertions about the scope and nature of a risk
prove out to be true?”15 Professor Blasi argues that the “overriding ob-
jective at all times should be to equip the [F]irst [A]mendment to do max-
imum service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox
ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most
likely to stifle dissent systematically.”16 He posits, consistent with this
rule, that “[t]he [F]irst [A]mendment, in other words, should be targeted
for the worst of times.”17 I agree entirely with his point—a point that
other prominent First Amendment scholars have made with great force.18
The theory seems both sound and sensible. Yet, a pressing question al-
most immediately arises: “But how can this be done?”19
In this brief Essay, I cannot hope to do more than identify some serious
and ongoing problems with clear-and-present-danger-based thinking in
the context of expressive freedoms. My preliminary thought, and one that
I assert only on a tentative basis, is that Justices Black and William O.
Douglas might have been correct in Brandenburg v. Ohio to argue that
speech should almost never be subject to criminal punishment as an in-
citement to unlawful action. Both Black and Douglas argued, with some
persuasive force, that the government should be limited to punishing un-
lawful actions rather than mere words.20
We see, even in contemporary times, judicial fears at work; if federal
courts protect certain kinds of particularly dangerous speech, assembly,
and association, “there could be trouble.”21 This is simply another mani-
15. See Wells, supra note 7, at 158–63 (discussing threat perception, risk perception,
and the psychological dynamics that lead people, including judges, to grossly overestimate
the potential risk of truly awful occurrences, such as terrorist attacks and observing that
“[w]hen individuals perceive the possibility of a highly dreaded or unknown event occur-
ring, they may overestimate the likelihood of this event or ignore the low likelihood of the
event and demand action to prevent it”).
16. Blasi, supra note 8, at 449–50.
17. Id. at 450.
18. See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF
AMERICA xi–xiv (1999).
19. In fairness to Professor Blasi, he sets forth a number of theoretical and doctrinal
principles that he argues could help operationalize the “pathological perspective,” includ-
ing, for example, strict and clear doctrinal rules against content and viewpoint censorship.
See Blasi, supra note 8, at 466–84, 504–13.
20. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449–50 (1969) (per curiam) (Black, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that “the ‘clear and present danger’ doctrine should have no place in the
interpretation of the First Amendment”); id. at 456–57 (Douglas, J. concurring) (arguing
that “[t]he line between what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be
made impermissible and subject to regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts” and
positing that pure speech should be “immune from prosecution”).
21. For a salient example, see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 38–40
(2010), which sustains a content-based ban on all communications abroad with certain
groups that appear on a State Department list of terrorist organizations. For another, see
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407–09 (2007), which sustains a public high school pun-
ishing a student for displaying a banner containing nonsense speech about marijuana use
(“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”). Both cases involve the Supreme Court abandoning strong pro-
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festation of the kind of judicial fear that undergirds the clear and present
danger test as applied by the majority in both Abrams v. United States
and Schenck. If we are truly committed to a political marketplace of ideas
that is “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,”22 then stronger constitu-
tional medicine than the clear and present danger test will be required.
Part I of this Essay considers the evolution in Justice Holmes’s applica-
tion, if not articulation, of the clear and present danger test. Part II pro-
vides a brief historical explanation for his change of heart during 1919
and, hence, his major remodel of how the clear and present danger test
should be applied to speech that calls for unlawful action. Part III pro-
vides an overview and critique of the clear and present danger test and
the cost/benefit calculus that undergirds it. This part argues that Professor
Blasi’s call for a pathological perspective and civic courage would support
an even more robust test that limits the government’s ability to ever pun-
ish mere advocacy of unlawful conduct. Part IV provides a brief summary
and conclusion.
The highly speech-protective iteration of the clear and present danger
test that Holmes articulated in Abrams was surely an improvement over
the “there might be trouble” version that he announced and applied in
Schenck. However, the larger question that needs to be asked and an-
swered is whether a test that renders the protection of political speech
contingent on fear provides sufficiently robust protection of the freedom
of speech. In my view, it does not. 23
Justice Louis Brandeis famously observed (apparently without irony):
“Men feared witches and burnt women.”24 Brandeis, ever the optimist,25
saw a positive role for the freedom of speech in this horrifying fact,
namely that “[i]t is the function of speech to free men from the bondage
tection for speech because of fears about the social costs of particular kinds of speech, even
though, on the record, there was no evidence at all to suggest that the specific speech
targeted for censorship presented any credible risk of bringing about a substantive social
harm. Instead, judicial fears about speech activity with designated terrorist groups and
speech arguably advocating marijuana use causing terrorist attacks or drug use by high
school students led the Supreme Court to sustain content-based speech bans applied to
speech that clearly implicated matters of public concern. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
443, 452–55 (2011) (holding that signs expressing homophobic viewpoints and attributing a
soldier’s death while on active duty abroad to God’s will constitutes speech about a matter
of public concern because, “[w]hile these messages may fall short of refined social or politi-
cal commentary, the issues they highlight—the political and moral conduct of the United
States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals
involving the Catholic clergy—are matters of public import”).
22. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
23. See infra Part III.
24. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
25. See Blasi, supra note 9, at 685 n.111 (“Brandeis was simply too much of an individ-
ualist, too dynamic in outlook, too fond of experimentation, too much a believer in eco-
nomic enterprise, too optimistic to fit comfortably within the civic humanist tradition.”);
see also id. at 676 (arguing that Brandeis believed public discourse would facilitate better
governance because “he believed that in a political community[,] personal qualities such as
hope and imagination tend to be contagious and reciprocal,” whereas repression of dissi-
dents foments “fear and hate” not only within dissenting communities but within the domi-
nant forces of the community as well).
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of irrational fears.”26 But what if a legislature views freedom of speech as
the cause of witch burnings rather than the cure? If one views the ques-
tion through this lens, then another regulatory response is both entirely
possible and reasonable: speech that might lead to the immolation of
large numbers of female citizens mistakenly thought to be witches should
be banned and actively suppressed by the state through the criminal law.
It takes an almost Kierkegaardian kind of existential faith in the possi-
bility of collective deliberative discourse to facilitate wise and humane
governance to believe that when truth and falsity wrestle, truth will al-
ways and inevitably win. The 2016 presidential election in the United
States and “Brexit” plebiscite in Britain render that proposition highly
doubtful. Even so, it might still be the case that protection of speech
“fraught with death”27—to use Holmes’s turn of phrase—should be pre-
ferred to active government censorship of “fake news.” If this is so, how-
ever, it is not because an unregulated marketplace of ideas will
inexorably lead the body politic to truth, but rather because the specter of
government censorship of political speech presents a more “clear and
present danger” to the free and fair operation of democratic politics than
affording socially worthless speech constitutional protection. 28
I. THE CREATION AND EVOLUTION OF JUSTICE HOLMES’S
VERSION OF THE CLEAR AND PRESENT
DANGER TEST
Justice Holmes debuted the clear and present danger test in his major-
ity opinion in Schenck. The case involved a group of socialists preparing
and distributing leaflets opposing the use of conscription during World
War I.29 Quoting the text of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished
slavery and involuntary servitude,30 the pamphlets exhorted men who
were subject to being drafted to “Assert Your Rights” and not to “submit
26. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376.
27. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
28. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Where’s the Harm?: Free Speech and the Regulation of
Lies, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1091, 1099–100 (2008) (arguing that socially valueless
speech, such as Holocaust denial, should enjoy First Amendment protection not because
persons who deny the Holocaust eventually will be brought around by the operation of the
marketplace of ideas, but rather because “[t]he dangers of allowing courts or other govern-
ment bodies to determine historical truth arguably outweighs the potential harm that Hol-
ocaust victims will suffer from official silence” and positing that banning false speech “may
have the unintended and paradoxical consequence of strengthening the [objectively false]
beliefs” producing a “perverse result”). Dean Lidsky warns that because of the psychologi-
cal dynamics at work, the “punishment of Holocaust denial is likely to lend it legitimacy”
and, hence, more adherents. Id. at 1100. In other words, we should not protect objectively
socially harmful speech because it possesses social value or plays an integral role in some
sort of dialectical reasoning process, but rather because government censorship is both
dangerous (it can be abused) and also counterproductive (it simply does not work).
29. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1919).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
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to intimidation.”31 Charles Schenck was part of an organization that had
15,000 copies of the circular printed and distributed via the mail.
The federal government indicted, tried, and convicted Schenck of viola-
tions of the Espionage Act of 1917.32 More specifically, the charges al-
leged that Schenck had acted to obstruct military recruiting incident to a
larger conspiracy to impede and obstruct recruiting military personnel.33
On appeal, Schenck argued that the First Amendment prohibited convict-
ing him of an offense for mere advocacy. The Supreme Court emphati-
cally rejected this argument in a unanimous opinion by Justice Holmes.
Holmes explained that “in many places and in ordinary times the de-
fendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within
their constitutional rights.”34 In time of war, however, “[i]t is a question
of proximity and degree” and “[w]hen a nation is at war many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their
utterance will not be endured so long as men fight . . . .”35 Holmes then
enunciated a version of a “bad tendencies” test: “The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”36
On the record before the Supreme Court, the government had failed to
establish that even one inductee had refused to report because of
Schenck’s advocacy, but the utter absence of any proof of efficacy was
entirely irrelevant. Holmes explained that the Espionage Act “punishes
conspiracies to obstruct as well as actual obstruction.” 37 Thus, if the cir-
culars sought to impede the induction of new soldiers, it could serve as a
basis for imposing criminal liability on Schenck.
A week later, on March 10, 1919, Justice Holmes delivered another
unanimous opinion in Debs v. United States.38 In Debs, Holmes glossed
the clear and present danger test announced in Schenck and explained
that a conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917 could stand if the
“words used had as their natural tendency and reasonably probable ef-
fect” obstruction of the federal government’s military recruiting efforts.39
In other words, speech “tending to obstruct” the government’s legitimate
efforts to enlist new members of the armed forces enjoys no protection
under the First Amendment.40 Holmes also authored a third opinion, is-
31. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51.
32. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917).
33. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48–49.




38. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
39. Id. at 216.
40. Id.
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sued on March 10, 1919, that applies the bad tendencies test in Frohwerk
v. United States.41
Between March 10, 1919, the day Debs and Frohwerk issued, and No-
vember 10, 1919, the day Abrams issued, Justice Holmes changed his
mind about the government’s ability to regulate mere advocacy of unlaw-
ful conduct. In his storied Abrams dissent, Justice Holmes radically re-
vised the clear and present danger test. No longer a bad tendencies test,
the test now placed a serious burden of justification on the government to
criminally punish speech.
In fact, the government had to show that criminal proscription of
speech was essential:
Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experi-
ment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe
and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing pur-
poses of the law that an immediate check is required to save the
country.42
Holmes famously articulated and embraced the metaphor of a “market-
place of ideas.” He argued,
The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.43
Although the words “clear and present danger” appear in both
Holmes’s opinions in Schenck and Abrams, the tests are radically differ-
ent. Under the Abrams version, the nature of the harm must be both very
serious and virtually certain, requiring an “immediate check” in order “to
save the country.”44 Speech that merely possesses a bad tendency—the
Schenck standard—would not meet this standard. Moreover, even if
speech is widely perceived to be affirmatively dangerous—quite literally
“fraught with death”45—it retains First Amendment protection unless it
is virtually certain to bring about, more or less immediately, a cata-
strophic harm (a calamity). Thus, the government may criminalize speech
only when an emergency “makes it immediately dangerous to leave the
correction of evil counsels to time.”46
This combination of requirements effectively prohibits convictions for
seditious libel. Under Holmes’s revised clear and present danger test, se-
vere public criticism of the government and its policies will almost always
41. 249 U.S. 204, 206–07 (1919) (holding that efforts to persuade individuals to resist
being drafted may be criminally punished without violating the First Amendment).




46. Id. at 630–31.
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enjoy robust First Amendment protection. It also bears noting that
Holmes strenuously objected to the sentences imposed on the Abrams
defendants—twenty years.47 In his view, only “the most nominal punish-
ment” could be imposed on the facts at bar.48 The lengthy sentences,
Holmes posited, reflected a deep-seated antipathy to “the creed that they
[the defendants] avow” (namely, revolutionary socialism)49 and punish-
ment for abstract ideological beliefs cannot be reconciled with the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.50
The evolution of the clear and present danger test from a very weak,
undemanding test into a near-absolute prohibition on government efforts
to criminalize the abstract advocacy of unlawful actions—all within the
course of less than eight months—reflects a remarkable evolution in Jus-
tice Holmes’s constitutional logic. His free speech jurisprudence radically
transformed from a posture of nearly abject deference to the government
to one of intense judicial skepticism of government censorship of political
speech. His Abrams dissent, to use Professor Blasi’s wonderful turn of
phrase, reflects a bold vision animated by civic courage—democratic self-
government implies tolerating risks.51
Of course, if the United States is genuinely committed to a program of
democratic self-government, there is really no other choice. Elections can
confer legitimacy on those who successfully contest them only if a process
of free and open deliberation informs the act of voting on election day.52
As the iconic free-speech theorist Alexander Meiklejohn explains, demo-
cratic deliberation requires “not that everyone shall speak,” but rather
that “everything worth saying shall be said.”53 Moreover, “[t]o be afraid
of ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for self-government.”54 In other words,
Meiklejohn argues that civic courage in the face of ideas widely believed
to be dangerous is not discretionary—in a well-functioning democracy, it
is mandatory.
The Holmes dissent in Abrams captures and reflects these crucial civic
values far better than does the myopic and stunted understanding of free-
dom of expression in mass participatory democracy set forth in his major-
ity opinion in Schenck. Even if this is so, however, one might still
reasonably question whether the clear and present danger test, as articu-
lated in Abrams, constitutes the best and most effective means of ensur-
47. See id. at 629 (“In this case sentences of twenty years imprisonment have been
imposed for the publishing of two leaflets that I believe the defendants had as much right
to publish as the Government has to publish the Constitution.”).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 629–30.
50. See id. at 629–31.
51. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If in
the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by
the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should
be given their chance and have their way.”).
52. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT 22–25, 89–91 (1948).
53. Id. at 25.
54. Id. at 27.
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ing that the government will refrain from squelching core political speech
based on fears that “there could be trouble” if it tolerates its
dissemination.
For the reasons that I will set forth in Part III,55 I share the skepticism
of both jurists and legal scholars about the reliability of the clear and
present danger test in times of national stress. First, however, it would be
useful to consider why Holmes experienced a change of heart; after all,
the reasons and arguments that brought Holmes from Schenck to Abrams
might well shed important light on the potential jurisprudential virtues of
the clear and present danger approach to enforcing the First Amendment.
Although Holmes obviously reached the conclusion on his own that the
Schenck version of the clear and present danger test seriously under pro-
tected core political speech—and accordingly, needed to be substantially
revised (i.e., strengthened) to better protect the public advocacy of politi-
cal thoughts, ideas, and ideologies—he certainly had some help in moving
his thinking forward to arrive at this result. 56
II. THE TARGETED INTERVENTIONS THAT HELPED TO
BRING ABOUT JUSTICE HOLMES’S CHANGE OF HEART
REGARDING THE SCOPE AND MEANING OF THE CLEAR
AND PRESENT DANGER TEST IN ABRAMS
So, what precisely happened between March 3, 1919, when the Su-
preme Court issued its decision in Schenck, and November 10, 1919,
when it released its decision in Abrams? Why did Justice Holmes change
his mind? That he changed his mind, as noted above, is clear beyond per-
adventure. The clear and present danger test morphed from a rather
weak bad tendencies test into a test that requires the government to es-
tablish an overriding need to censor speech to avoid a calamity from be-
falling the nation.
Legal historians have provided the answer. Some measure of the credit
belongs to Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., of the Harvard Law School
faculty. Chafee engaged in a full-fledged lobbying effort to convince Jus-
tice Holmes that his approach in Schenck grossly under-protected the
freedom of political speech. His campaign included publishing, at light-
ning speed, an article57 proposing a new, more robust iteration of the
clear and present danger test.58
Chafee strenuously argued that:
Truth can be sifted out from falsehood only if the government is vig-
orously and constantly cross-examined, so that the fundamental is-
sues of the struggle may be clearly defined, and the war may not be
diverted to improper ends, or conducted with an undue sacrifice of
55. See infra notes 74–131 and accompanying text.
56. See infra Part II.
57. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932
(1919). Chafee’s article appeared in the June 1919 edition of the Harvard Law Review.
58. See id. at 958–68.
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life and liberty, or prolonged after its just purposes are
accomplished.59
He strongly criticized Justice Holmes for embracing a test that focuses
instead on the “bad tendency” of speech, objecting that “bad tendency
has been the test of criminality, a test which this article has endeavored to
prove wholly inconsistent with freedom of speech, or any genuine discus-
sion of public affairs.”60 Chafee deemed it “regrettable that Justice
Holmes did nothing to emphasize the social interest behind free speech,
and show the need of balancing even in war time.”61
If Chafee hit the volleyball into the air, then Harold Laski, a Harvard
history professor and Holmes’s chum, hit the ball over the net. During
the summer of 1919, Laski personally lobbied Holmes to read the Chafee
article.62 He also finagled a meeting between Chafee and Holmes during
the summer of 1919, when both were in Rockport, Massachusetts (where
Holmes routinely spent time in the summer months).63 At this meeting,
Chafee and Laski pressed the case for deploying the First Amendment
more robustly to protect political speech. Laski continued his efforts to
lobby Holmes over that summer—for example, recommending that
Holmes read books advocating broad protection for the freedom of
speech (which Holmes did).64
Judge Learned Hand also merits a significant measure of credit for
helping move Holmes from his positions in Schenck, Debs, and Frohwerk,
which all embraced a bad tendencies test, to his Abrams dissent, which
would have held speech protected “unless [speech] so imminently
threaten[s] immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes
of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.”65 In
March 1919, after the Supreme Court released its decisions in Schenck,
Debs, and Frohwerk, Hand wrote to Holmes to communicate his disa-
greement with both the outcome and reasoning of the Supreme Court in
these cases.66 Holmes responded: “I don’t quite get your point,”67 but the
Justice’s subsequent behavior suggested that, in point of fact, he did get
Hand’s point.
Judge Hand lamented his inability to bring Holmes around in a letter
of May 7, 1919, to Ernst Freund. Freund, a University of Chicago law
professor, had written a critical essay on the bad tendencies test that ap-
peared in the New Republic. In this letter, Judge Hand complained that “I
59. Id. at 958.
60. Id. at 968.
61. Id.
62. THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
CHANGED HIS MIND – AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 154–55
(2013).
63. Id. at 35–36, 153, 158–59.
64. Id. at 159–63.
65. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
66. RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 218–19 (1987).
67. Id. at 219.
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have so far been unable to make him see that he and we have any real
differences and that puzzles me a little.”68
In an October 20, 1919 letter to Harold Laski, Holmes previewed some
of his main themes in his iconic Abrams dissent.69 He wrote that he wor-
ried “we have less freedom of speech here than . . . in England.”70
Holmes observed that “[w]hen you are thoroughly convinced you are
right — wholeheartedly desire an end — and have no doubt of your
power to accomplish it — I see nothing but municipal regulations to in-
terfere with your using your power to accomplish it.”71 He added that
“[l]ittle as I believe in [freedom of speech leading to truth] as a theory I
hope I would die for it and I go as far as anyone . . . in favor of it.”72
Based on this letter, we know with something approaching absolute cer-
tainty that the full court press by Hand, Chafee, Laski, and Freund had
worked: Justice Holmes had changed his mind about the proper scope of
the First Amendment’s application and no longer embraced a bad ten-
dencies approach to enforcing it.
I do not mean to suggest that Hand, Chafee, Laski, and Freund are
responsible, individually or collectively, for Justice Holmes’s change of
heart. But surely they deserve at least some measure of credit for con-
vincing this iconic jurist to rethink his approach to the First Amendment.
As historian Richard Polenberg states the point, even though by October
1919 Holmes had not yet come around completely to the position of
Hand, Chafee, Laski, and Freund, “his reading of history, biography, and
political philosophy had made Holmes more sensitive to the value of free
speech as a means of getting at the truth, to the importance of experimen-
tation, and to the need to treat dissenters mercifully.”73 Thus, whatever
the precise causation, between March and late October, Justice Holmes
substantially revised his views regarding the viability and the very consti-
tutionality of the bad tendencies approach to enforcing the First
Amendment.
III. THE PATHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE AND THE CLEAR
AND PRESENT DANGER TEST
This section begins by considering how the Supreme Court attempted
to reform the clear and present danger test by radically increasing the
government’s burden of justification in cases involving incitements to un-
lawful conduct. It continues by showing how, despite this effort, the clear
68. Id. at 221.
69. Id. at 227–28.
70. Id. at 228.
71. Id. This language is remarkably close to the language Holmes used in his iconic
Abrams dissent. See United States v. Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) (“If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result
with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all
opposition.”).
72. POLENBERG, supra note 66, at 228.
73. Id. at 227.
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and present danger test continues to cause damage to core First Amend-
ment values. In at least two relatively recent cases, the Supreme Court
has essentially adopted a clear and present danger approach to speech
activity with terrorist organizations74 and nonsense speech that arguably
advocated the use of marijuana by kids.75 Thus, even though the clear
and present danger test no longer governs criminal liability for incite-
ment, it continues to warp First Amendment jurisprudence in ways that
seriously disserve core First Amendment values.
This section concludes by considering whether it is possible to reform
the clear and present danger test effectively (i.e., to defang it). This sec-
tion will also examine the related—and no less important—question of
whether federal judges will ever be able to wean themselves from clear-
and-present-danger-test-type reasoning. So long as federal judges rou-
tinely take into account the potential social cost of speech activity, clear-
and-present-danger-type reasoning will find its way into the pages of the
United States Reports and the Federal Reporter.
A. THE WARREN COURT’S EFFORTS TO TAME THE CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER TEST
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court did as much as it could do
to reign in the potential ill effects of the clear and present danger test by
requiring the nature of the harm to be extreme and the probability of it
occurring virtually certain.76 The case involved a Ku Klux Klan rally in
suburban Cincinnati, Ohio, where the participants called for a race war—
at some indefinite time in the future.77 The most directly relevant com-
ments included the statement that “We’re not a revengent [sic] organiza-
tion, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to
suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to
be some revengeance [sic] taken.”78 In another comment that served as a
basis for criminal charges under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act,79 the
Klan speaker called for the repatriation of African-Americans to Africa
and Jewish Americans to Israel.80
A criminal petit jury convicted Brandenburg of criminal syndicalism—
meaning advocating or calling for “crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform.”81 The trial court then fined Brandenburg $1,000 and sentenced
him to a jail term of one to ten years.82 The state intermediate appellate
74. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 31–32 (2010).
75. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394–95 (2007).
76. 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam).
77. Id. at 445–47.
78. Id. at 446.
79. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (West 1958).
80. The exact language, which is profoundly offensive, does not bear quotation. See
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
81. § 2923.13.
82. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–445.
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court affirmed both the conviction and sentence; the Supreme Court of
Ohio declined to review the case on the merits.83
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a brief, per curiam opinion,
reversed Brandenburg’s conviction and voided Ohio’s Criminal Syndical-
ism Act, § 2923.13 of the Ohio Revised Code, on First Amendment
grounds. The Court held:
The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.84
Mere abstract teaching or advocacy cannot serve as the basis for criminal
charges, but neither can calls for unlawful action at some indefinite point
in the future. Moreover, “[a] statute which fails to draw this distinction
impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments,” because such a law “sweeps within its con-
demnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from govern-
ment control.”85
After Brandenburg, only calls to “imminent lawless action”86 can be
criminalized and, even then, only if the call to imminent lawless action is
highly likely to be successful.87 Brandenburg essentially requires that
speech directly advocate lawless action and that the words are likely to
bring about the unlawful conduct more or less immediately. These re-
quirements significantly restrict the government’s ability to proscribe
mere advocacy of unlawful action.
Even so, however, Justices Black and Douglas concurred in Branden-
burg because they believed that the per curiam opinion was insufficiently
protective of the freedom of speech. Justice Black argued that “the ‘clear
and present danger’ doctrine should have no place in the interpretation of
the First Amendment.”88 Justice Douglas, carefully revisiting prior Su-
preme Court precedents citing and applying the clear and present danger
83. Id. at 445.
84. Id. at 447.
85. Id. at 448.
86. Id. at 449.
87. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108–09 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that a call
to unlawful action must be both “intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent
disorder” to be criminally punished and that words may “not be punished by the State on
the ground that they had ‘a tendency to lead to violence’”). Hess clearly repudiates the bad
tendency test that the Supreme Court adopted and applied in Dennis. See Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 508–10 (1951) (holding that the government may prohibit words that
advocate lawless activity even if the probability of it occurring is low provided that the
nature of the risk is sufficiently grave); see also Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216
(1919) (“We should add that the jury were most carefully instructed that they could not
find the defendant guilty for advocacy of any of his opinions unless the words used had as
their natural tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service, &c.,
and unless the defendant had the specific intent to do so in his mind.” (emphasis added)).
88. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449–50 (Black, J., concurring).
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test,89 rejected it because, in his view, “all matters of belief are beyond
the reach of subpoenas or the probings of investigators.”90 Douglas posits
that the government may never punish speech qua speech. Instead, “[t]he
line between what is permissible and not subject to control and what may
be made impermissible and subject to regulation is the line between ideas
and overt acts.”91
The Black/Douglas position is an intriguing one. Should the govern-
ment be limited to punishing criminal acts alone? And never permitted to
criminalize mere speech even if the speech directly advocates unlawful
action? Neither Justice Douglas nor Justice Black mean that speech may
never be the subject of criminal charges—for example, if someone tries to
defraud senior citizens by selling them investments in a Ponzi scheme, the
fact that speech is used to accomplish the crime does not bring it within
the First Amendment’s ambit.92 However, they were committed to the
idea that political advocacy and political activity could never be the sub-
ject of criminal liability.
The law of incitement is sufficiently demanding post-Brandenburg that
the difference between the per curiam opinion and the concurring opin-
ions of Justices Black and Douglas contains relatively little daylight. The
requirements of a direct call to action, a subjective intent to bring about
the harm, and a very high objective probability of the harm coming into
being make charges for “criminal syndicalism” a matter of merely histori-
cal interest. However, an important, larger question about the use of so-
cial cost to set the metes and bounds of the First Amendment’s scope of
coverage remains with us today and continues to vex judges tasked with
deciding whether or not the government may punish speech in order to
reduce the risk of incurring serious social costs.
B. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST-STYLE REASONING
CONTINUES TO UNDERCUT CORE FIRST AMENDMENT
VALUES INCLUDING THE RULE AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT ENGAGING IN CONTENT-
AND VIEWPOINT-BASED CENSORSHIP
Even though Brandenburg banished the weak form of the clear and
present danger test enunciated by Justice Holmes in Schenck, Debs, and
Frohwerk, it did not, and probably could not, banish the more general
reliance on the Hand Formula to establish the limits of protected speech.
89. See id. at 450–56 (Douglas, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 456.
91. Id.
92. See id. (arguing that speech intended to cause and that in fact causes harm, such as
falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater, can be the subject of criminal prosecution
consistent with the First Amendment); see also Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the
First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1765, 1768–74 (2004) (describing and discussing how large swaths of everyday speech lay
entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment and observing that this state of
affairs does not seem to generate much excitement or concern among academics, judges, or
lawyers).
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When a harm seems sufficiently dreadful— “fraught with death”93 to use
the nomenclature favored by Justice Holmes in his Abrams dissent—most
federal judges seek out the nearest available exit and do so by the short-
est available route. Doctrinal niceties tend to go out the window when the
government’s parade of horribles is sufficiently horrible. This is precisely
why Justices Black and Douglas were so adamant in Brandenburg that
any iteration of the clear and present danger test would afford insufficient
protection to political advocacy.
Without belaboring the point, two relatively recent decisions reflect the
resilience of the kind of parade of horribles reasoning that animates the
weak version of the clear and present danger test. The first, Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, sustains a content- and speaker-based ban on
speech abroad with organizations that appear on a State Department list
of known terrorist organizations.94 The second, Morse v. Frederick, sus-
tains non-criminal punishment of a student in a public high school for
speech the majority deemed to advocate the use of marijuana.95 Both
cases reflect the kind of damage that clear and present danger reasoning
can wreak on core First Amendment values when the potential social cost
of advocacy frightens federal judges.
In Humanitarian Law Project, the majority sustained a federal law that
criminalized providing “material support” to any organization appearing
on a State Department list of known foreign terrorist organizations.96
Since 1997, the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) appeared on the State
Department’s list.97
The Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) sought to meet with members of
the PKK to teach them non-violent dispute resolution techniques.98 The
federal government did not make any credible argument that the HLP
intended to offer any direct aid or “material support” to the PKK’s un-
lawful activities or objectives. Instead, the government argued that any
contact between U.S. citizens and the PKK would lend the organization
credibility, and even support of lawful activities by the PKK would thus
lend indirect support to its unlawful purposes and objectives.99
The Supreme Court, ostensibly applying strict scrutiny to a content-
based speech regulation, found that the federal government had estab-
lished both a compelling government interest and also had used the least
restrictive means to achieve it.100 Both claims are dubious at best. Essen-
tially, in the majority’s view, any contact by U.S. citizens with the PKK
presented a clear and present danger of aiding the PKK’s unlawful terror-
93. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
94. 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010).
95. 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007).
96. See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 7–14.
97. Id. at 9–10.
98. Id. at 10.
99. See Brief for the Respondents at 55–56, Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1
(Nos. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 4951303, at *55–56.
100. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 33–39
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istic objectives.101
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., explained that:
Given the sensitive interests in national security and foreign affairs
at stake, the political branches have adequately substantiated their
determination that, to serve the Government’s interest in preventing
terrorism, it was necessary to prohibit providing material support in
the form of training, expert advice, personnel, and services to foreign
terrorist groups, even if the supporters meant to promote only the
groups’ nonviolent ends.102
According to the majority, the use of nonviolent dispute resolution
techniques could conceivably be weaponized by terrorist organizations.103
Despite criticizing the dissent for failing to appreciate the “real dangers at
stake,”104 the majority fails to point to any record evidence that shows a
direct link between training in international law and fomenting terroristic
attacks.
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged the absence of any concrete evi-
dence that the specific speech and associational activity that HLP hoped
to engage in with members of the PKK would cause any serious harm
that the federal government may constitutionally seek to prevent. How-
ever, “[t]he Government, when seeking to prevent imminent harms in the
context of international affairs and national security, is not required to
conclusively link all the pieces in the puzzle before we grant weight to its
empirical conclusions.”105 This language could easily have appeared in
the majority opinions in Schenck, Debs, Frohwerk, Abrams, or Dennis.
Because of the serious gravity of the harm, the absence of any empiri-
cal proof that contact of the sort HLP proposed with the PKK would
bring such harm about is entirely irrelevant to the First Amendment anal-
ysis. In fact, the mere possibility that contact abroad between U.S. citi-
zens and members of the PKK could lend the PKK “legitimacy” serves as
a constitutionally sufficient justification for a content-based speech and
association ban.106
The clear and present danger test that Justices Black and Douglas
feared and loathed is alive and well and stalking the pages of the United
States Reports. Humanitarian Law Project simply substitutes the word
“terrorist” for other words used in cases from the twentieth century
(namely “communist,” “socialist,” and “anarchist”) as a basis for the gov-
ernment imposing a flat ban on activities otherwise squarely protected by
101. Id.
102. Id. at 36.
103. Id. at 37 (“A foreign terrorist organization introduced to the structures of the in-
ternational legal system might use the information to threaten, manipulate, and disrupt.
This possibility is real, not remote.”).
104. Id. at 38.
105. Id. at 35.
106. See id. at 30 (“It also importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist
groups—legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and
to raise funds—all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”).
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the First Amendment (including speech, assembly, petition, and associa-
tion). For the record, I do not have any problem with the federal govern-
ment proscribing material support of terrorist activities, but contact with
individuals and organizations aimed at teaching them non-violent dispute
resolution techniques simply does not constitute support of terrorism. In-
deed, the majority’s parade of horribles reasoning comes perilously close
to resembling a bad joke. In the Supreme Court’s view, however, the war
on terrorism justifies circumscribing First Amendment freedoms because
any contact with a terrorist organization presents a clear and present dan-
ger of facilitating terroristic acts.
Along very similar lines, the Supreme Court sustained the imposition
of serious discipline against Joseph Frederick, a student at a public high
school in Juneau, Alaska, for displaying a banner with the phrase
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” on it.107 He did so at the 2002 Winter Olympic
Torch Relay, as it passed through Juneau, Alaska. The high school’s prin-
cipal, Deborah Morse, stormed across the street and confronted Freder-
ick, demanding that he take down the banner.108 After he refused, the
school district suspended him for ten days from school. The school board
maintained a policy banning speech advocating the use of substances that
are unlawful for minors while at school-related functions and events. 109
Technically, the relay was not a school assembly, and the banner was
not even displayed on public school district property. But the Supreme
Court characterized attendance at the torch relay as a school-sponsored
event and treated it as a high school assembly.110 The message on the
banner, which would appear to most reasonable observers to constitute a
silly, nonsense message, actually constituted nefarious advocacy of pot
smoking by kids, according to the Morse majority.111
Having resolved both the locus of the speech activity and the meaning
of the banner issues against Frederick, the Morse majority proceeded to
frame the constitutional question presented as follows: “[W]hether a
principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student
speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as pro-
moting illegal drug use.”112 The majority concluded that public school
district administrators need not tolerate such speech at school-sponsored
events.113 Speech of this sort contradicts the government’s anti-drug
abuse policies and may, therefore, be censored.114
This case actually presents a question regarding how the incitement
doctrine should apply to public school students at an official school event.
One suitable way of framing the relevant question would be to inquire
107. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397, 407–09 (2007).
108. Id. at 398.
109. Id. at 397–99.
110. Id. at 400–01.
111. See id. at 401–03.
112. Id. at 403.
113. See id. at 409.
114. See id. at 407–09.
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whether, on the assumption that Frederick’s nonsense message actually
constituted a clarion call for high school students to smoke marijuana,
that advice was likely to be heeded. And, if so, was it on an imminent
basis?
Of course, if one applies the Brandenburg test for incitement to unlaw-
ful action, the question is not even close—there was no record evidence
that, upon seeing Frederick’s banner, dozens of naughty high school stu-
dents took out joints and bongs and proceeded to get high. To conclude
that Frederick advocated unlawful activity is a stretch,115 but even assum-
ing he did and that his subjective hope was that his classmates would take
bong hits to please Jesus, there was simply no evidence that his advocacy
created a serious risk of unlawful behavior actually occurring.116
But, once again, the clear and present danger test, phoenix-like, rises
from the ash heap of constitutional law history to drive a result in a major
First Amendment case. Whether or not Frederick’s advocacy was even
marginally efficacious was entirely beside the point. Chief Justice Roberts
explained that:
It was reasonable for her [Principal Morse] to conclude that the ban-
ner promoted illegal drug use—in violation of established school pol-
icy—and that failing to act would send a powerful message to the
students in her charge, including Frederick, about how serious the
school was about the dangers of illegal drug use. The First Amend-
ment does not require schools to tolerate at school events student
expression that contributes to those dangers.117
To speak of Frederick’s banner as presenting a danger of rampant mari-
juana use by high school classmates of Frederick is utterly preposterous.
A court could find Frederick’s speech proscribable only if the school dis-
trict had absolutely no burden to establish that his advocacy would actu-
ally incite unlawful drug use.
As it happens, however, because of the gravity of the evil, the fact that
no realistic possibility of anyone acting on Frederick’s advocacy was en-
tirely constitutionally irrelevant. Roberts observed that “[s]tudent speech
celebrating illegal drug use at a school event, in the presence of school
administrators and teachers, . . . poses a particular challenge for school
officials working to protect those entrusted to their care from the dangers
of drug abuse.”118 Not unlike Mr. Mackey from South Park, Principal
Morse must be permitted to propagate an uncontested message that
“Drugs Are Bad, Mkay.” Although my own view is that it is ludicrous to
read Frederick’s banner as meaning “Let’s All Toke, Right Now!,” why
115. See id. at 439–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 436–38 (“No one seriously maintains that drug advocacy (much less Fred-
erick’s ridiculous sign) comes within the vanishingly small category of speech that can be
prohibited because of its feared consequences. Such advocacy, to borrow from Justice
Holmes, ‘ha[s] no chance of starting a present conflagration.’” (quoting Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (dissenting opinion))).
117. Id. at 410 (majority opinion).
118. Id. at 408.
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shouldn’t a high school student be permitted to advocate the legalization
of marijuana as a social policy? And a minimum age that permits at least
some high school students to legally purchase, possess, and consume ma-
rijuana products?
To take a similar example, in much of Europe, the drinking age is well
below twenty-one and rates of binge drinking and driving while intoxi-
cated are markedly lower than in the United States. Could a public school
district suspend or expel a student who carries a sign stating “Let 16 Year
Olds Drink Alcohol Legally!”? Because advocating a change in our ex-
isting social policies might lead some persons under twenty-one to quaff a
beer before they may do so legally (like Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who
famously liked beer before it was lawful for him to do so)?
Protecting minors from substance abuse is certainly an important, per-
haps even a compelling, government interest. But advocating the legaliza-
tion of marijuana or a lower drinking age is not the same thing as actually
consuming pot or alcoholic beverages. Conflating speech with unlawful
acts, because the speech might have a “bad tendency,” is the principal
vice of the clear and present danger test. And, this kind of reasoning, and
this very vice, clearly manifest in the Morse majority’s opinion, which
conflates mere advocacy with unlawful conduct. Even if Frederick’s ban-
ner advocated the use of marijuana, absent evidence that there was a high
risk that his speech would imminently cause harm, he should not have
been subject to discipline for displaying it in public.
Ill-considered or poorly conceived advocacy should enjoy no less
purchase on the First Amendment than advice passing along the widely
accepted wisdom of the ages. And, unless “an immediate check is re-
quired to save the country,”119 to use Justice Holmes’ wonderful turn of
phrase in his iconic Abrams dissent, the proper remedy for Frederick’s
poor counsel should have been wiser counsel from Principal Morse rather
than government censorship of Frederick’s message. A government em-
powered to censor “bad ideas” is likely to use that power to skew the
political marketplace of ideas to suit its preferences. And, even if one
thinks that Frederick’s message added little value to the process of demo-
cratic discourse, a school district that can censor Frederick’s nonsense is
equally empowered to censor another student’s political advocacy for the
reform of drug laws (perhaps including legalization of marijuana, but also
encompassing, for example, efforts to secure criminal justice reform in
the context of drug-related offenses).
To be sure, one could attempt to minimize the importance of both Hu-
manitarian Law Project and Morse. Humanitarian Law Project involves
transborder speech activity—a form of First Amendment activity that has
never enjoyed full and robust First Amendment protection.120 So too,
public school students may not shed their constitutional rights at the
119. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
120. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transborder Speech, 94 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 473 (2018).
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schoolhouse gate,121 but the Supreme Court has been quite solicitous of
content-based speech bans in the context of a public school’s curricu-
lum.122 Thus, both areas of First Amendment law feature decisions that
are more deferential to censorial government officials than holds true in
other contexts. Even so, it is simply not plausible to fail to acknowledge
that reasoning premised on the social harm of terrorism, on the one hand,
and drug use by high school students, on the other, animated the majority
in both Humanitarian Law Project and Morse.
C. SHOULD THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST BE
REFORMED OR ABANDONED?
Decisions like Humanitarian Law Project and Morse demonstrate that
the concerns expressed by Justices Black and Douglas in Brandenburg
were not without some basis in fact. Speech that has even a very low
probability of causing serious social harms will prove a tempting target
for censorially-minded government regulators. Moreover, federal judges
who lack the civic courage of Justices Holmes and Brandeis may not be
much inclined to disallow speech bans designed to forestall serious social
harms (like acts of terrorism or drug use by minors). If Brandenburg did
nothing to protect the members of Humanitarian Law Project or Joseph
Frederick, the test is not a free speech jurisprudential panacea.
We also see that federal court judges are sometimes inclined to back-
slide into clear and present danger reasoning to sustain government
speech bans when the stakes seem sufficiently high and the social value of
the speech in question appears sufficiently low. The question that arises
from this state of affairs is: How can we best prevent judges from using a
very low probability of a serious harm occurring as a basis for permitting
the government to ban speech?
There is nothing particularly weak-kneed or objectionable about Bran-
denburg’s rehabilitation of the clear and present danger test. It requires a
direct call to unlawful activity, 123 a subjective intent to bring about an
unlawful act, and an imminent risk of causing an unlawful act to occur.124
The problem arises when the Supreme Court declines to apply Branden-
burg at all—as happened in both Humanitarian Law Project and Morse.
121. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment,
are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate.”).
122. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–73 (1988); Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683–85 (1986).
123. Learned Hand actually pioneered this device as a means of protecting unpopular
political speech and unpopular political speakers. See Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F.
535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (“Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as such, with direct incite-
ment to violent resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all methods of political agitation
which in normal times is a safeguard of free government. The distinction is not a scholastic
subterfuge, but a hard-bought acquisition in the fight for freedom, and the purpose to
disregard it must be evident when the power exists.”), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
124. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam).
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Even if the Supreme Court had taken the approach advocated by Jus-
tices Black and Douglas in Brandenburg and required the government to
publish bad acts and not speech that calls for unlawful action, it seems
doubtful that the outcome in either Humanitarian Law Project or Morse
would have been different. It is easy enough, for example, to characterize
support for a terrorist organization as either a conspiracy to advance their
unlawful objectives or as constituting being an accessory before or after
the fact.
The Humanitarian Law Project majority could easily have character-
ized § 2339B as regulating criminal conduct rather than speech. By parity
of logic, advocating illegal drug use while on a public high school campus
or at a school-sponsored event could be characterized as a form of unlaw-
ful conduct rather than a ban on abstract advocacy. A more demanding
First Amendment test that limits government to regulating “conduct”
would not necessarily prevent a majority of the Supreme Court from per-
mitting the federal and state governments to regulate or even proscribe
“speech acts.” Even Justice Douglas, in his Brandenburg concurring opin-
ion, conceded that falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater may be
the subject of a criminal prosecution as a kind of speech act.125
The larger problem is judicial credulousness—not the precise articula-
tion of the governing legal test or formula. No legal formula will, as if by
magic, succeed in making judges brave in times of national chaos and
panic.126 No matter how robust a verbal formulation of the requisite bur-
den on the government, a traumatic national or international event will
inevitably shake judicial confidence and lead federal judges to be more,
rather than less, deferential to the political branches.
That, at bottom, is the problem with Professor Blasi’s pathological per-
spective. He is undoubtedly correct to posit that federal judges should
protect speech with greater alacrity and vigor in times of national tumult.
The difficulty, however, is getting judges to act contrary to their deeply
felt instincts. In times of war or national crisis, the natural reaction of
most judges is to be more, rather than less, deferential to Congress and
the President. Getting federal judges to check that entirely understanda-
ble impulse is probably easier said than done. Put another way, the prin-
cipal difficulty may be one of psychology rather than law.127
If this is so, trying to parse the exact words used to constrain judicial
discretion constitutes a quixotic task. No magic spell or legal incantation
will make judges exhibit more courage than they are otherwise capable of
125. Id. at 456–57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (positing that “where speech is brigaded
with action” the speech and conduct “are indeed inseparable and a prosecution can be
launched for the overt acts actually caused”). Justice Douglas characterizes speech acts as
“rare instances,” id. at 457, but because so many crimes involve pure speech (for example,
many kinds of fraud), it’s simply not possible to say that “speech alone” cannot serve as a
predicate for criminal charges. Once that concession has been made, however, drawing the
line between protected political advocacy and unlawful conduct by speech acts becomes an
exceedingly difficult task.
126. See Wells, supra note 7, at 201–22.
127. See id. at 158–80.
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mustering (both individually and collectively). It is always easy to say,
with the benefit of hindsight, “We made the wrong call in that case.”128
And sometimes, the Supreme Court recognizes its original error in fairly
short order.129 The difficulty inheres in figuring out how to prevent the
Supreme Court from taking the initial “wrong turn” in the first place.
For myself, I am skeptical that any particular verbal formula can safe-
guard constitutional rights in times of perceived national crisis. When the
nation faces challenges that many in our polity believe present an existen-
tial threat, federal judges are unlikely to impose judicial restraints on pol-
icies generally and widely accepted as essential to the survival of the
nation. And, even if a legal test is framed in the most demanding terms,
for example, as demanding strict judicial scrutiny, when the nation is at
war, even very capable judges are going to be inclined to apply the test in
a forgiving fashion.130
That said, constitutional tests are fashioned for times of peace and
plenty as much, if not more, than for times of stress and turmoil. And
more robust tests are likely to function more reliably in times of normalcy
than tests that require relatively little of the government by way of justifi-
cation for laws or policies that abridge or flatly deny fundamental consti-
tutional rights. From this vantage point, then, Holmes’s change of heart
between Schenck and Abrams constitutes a seismic shift in the meaning,
import, and practical legal effect of the First Amendment as a limitation
on government efforts to censor speech critical of its programs and activi-
ties. In sum, the failures of law to check the government in times of war
should not be taken as a license for judicial abdication in times of peace.
Unlike Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court did not change its mind
about the merits of the bad tendencies test for applying the First Amend-
ment in the fall of 1919—or for a considerably longer period of time
thereafter (arguably not until Brandenburg in 1969). Even today, the Su-
preme Court can and does fall under the spell of “the ends justify the
means” reasoning in important First Amendment cases (like Humanita-
rian Law Project and Morse) and relies on “bad tendencies” reasoning to
128. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944), abrogated by
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). But cf. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (“The dissent’s
reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what
is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been over-
ruled in the court of history, and—to be clear —‘has no place in law under the Constitu-
tion.’” (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting))).
129. Compare Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940) (upholding a
Pennsylvania law mandating participation by public school children in a daily flag salute
exercise), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), with
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (invalidating on First Amendment grounds a West Virginia state
law requiring all public school students to participate in a mandatory daily flag salute
exercise).
130. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (“It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal re-
strictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That
is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the
existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”).
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justify content-based speech regulations. In light of this reality, we proba-
bly should be realistic about the capacity of mere words to constrain ef-
fectively judicial discretion. Precedent can and does have a constraining
effect, but at the end of the day, it limits but does not control substantive
outcomes in constitutional litigation.
On the other hand, however, the inability of any particular legal test or
verbal formula to work consistently over time and across cases should not
be taken as evidence that words simply do not matter and that the rigor
of a legal test (or the lack of it) will never constrain judicial discretion
effectively. The Holmes dissent in Abrams is an iconic and enduring
paean to the values and importance of the freedom of speech—even in a
nation actively engaged in waging a war to end all wars. As such, it calls
judges, lawyers, and ordinary citizens to think carefully and deliberately
before indulging in our quite natural impulse to silence speakers whose
views and ideas seem seriously misguided, highly offensive, or even dan-
gerous (if not quite “fraught with death”).131
IV. CONCLUSION
If, from time to time, federal judges fail to honor either the letter or the
spirit of Justice Holmes’s robust defense in his Abrams dissent of the ab-
solute necessity of unfettered freedom of political speech in a democratic
polity, we should perhaps keep in mind that Holmes himself initially
failed to honor the letter and spirit of these powerful views before seeing
and publicly acknowledging the error of his own ways—and he did so
only after several highly targeted, and clearly effective, interventions,
both public and private, by Chafee, Laski, Hand, and Freund.132 Moreo-
ver, no matter how strict a particular test for measuring the government’s
burden of production and persuasion in a First Amendment case, a risk
will always exist that federal judges will permit fear to overcome their
reason. As Justice Brandeis observed in his famous Whitney concurrence,
“Men feared witches and burnt women”133—so too, the Supreme Court’s
bench feared socialists and anarchists and jailed union leaders.134
Brandeis was surely correct to posit that “[i]t is the function of speech
to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.”135 Irrational fears—
whether of communists, socialists, terrorists, or pot smoking teenagers—
commonly lead courts to abandon the First Amendment’s core values and
to embrace the irrational fear that speech, if tolerated, will bring the na-
tion to utter ruination. Civic courage is plainly requisite—but it is also
sometimes a scarce judicial commodity.
In my view, the greater threat to our nation’s existence and flourishing
lies in permitting government to decide which political ideas are fit for
131. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
132. See supra text and accompanying notes 57–73.
133. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
134. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216–17 (1919).
135. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376.
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public discussion and which are not. As Alexander Meiklejohn so force-
fully argued, to permit the government to protect us from bad ideas—
ideas that have bad tendencies— “would seem to be an admission that we
are intellectually and morally unfit to play our part in what Justice
Holmes called the ‘experiment’ of self-government.”136 The same can be
said for political associations and assemblies in support of causes that
provoke widespread fear or rouse many citizens to righteous anger.137
Democratic self-government can function properly only if there is a dy-
namic and ongoing public discourse about those who hold government
power and the policies that they propose to implement on behalf of “We
the People.” Elections can secure government accountability only if vot-
ers have the freedom to speak and think for themselves and, therefore,
can cast well-informed ballots that reflect the benefit of a lively and ongo-
ing process of democratic deliberation. The Justice Holmes of Schenck
betrayed these core First Amendment values and functions, whereas the
Justice Holmes of the iconic Abrams dissent forcefully vindicated them.
Let us hope, over the longer run of history, that the Holmes of Abrams
prevails over the Holmes of Schenck in the federal courts and also in our
national constitutional ethos.
136. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 52, at xiii–xiv.
137. For a useful—and highly persuasive—discussion of the importance of protecting
unpopular groups and their ability to participate in public protest, see generally JOHN D.
INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012).
